As in every crisis, capitalism’s ruling elites, in order, among other things, to manage the current economic-financial crisis, are redesigning the institutions, which is what is happening in the EU with the Euro Plus Pact, the Six Pack and now with the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union (signed on March 2, 2012).
Italy has adjusted itself to these tendencies with the constitution of the Monti government, which is not a “technical” government – it was wanted by the EU, directly represents Italy’s industrial bourgeoisie and the banks, above all the components tied to the global market, and enjoys the support of the Catholic hierarchy. The Monti government is the direct expression of the neoliberal policies imposed by the EU on the PIIGS, and specifically on Italy with the Aufust 5 Trichet-Draghi letter.
After the first “economic manoeuvre” of last July (Decree Law 98/ 2011) and the pressure of the financial markets and of the EU on Italy to intensify the austerity policies, in the midst of the summer, to be precise on August 5, Jean-Claude Trichet, president of the ECB, and Mario Draghi, governor of the Banca d’Italia, sent a letter to the President of the Council Berlusconi – improperly designated as Prime Minister – indicating exactly what the latest interventions would be to enforce compliance with the obligations assumed in the European Councils and in the documents which marked the first “European semester”. Thus August saw the launching, with the Decree Law 138/2011, of a second stabilising manoeuvre with a 60 billion Euro corrective effect on budget balances for 2014.
Before examining the letter of the two bankers, it is well to remember that the ECOFIN Council of September 2010 modified the Code of Conduct for the implementation of the Stability and Growth Pact via procedures of the “European Semester” initiated in January 2010. Their novelty consists in the discussion and in the ex ante indication of budget-balancing policies whose principal phases are: a) in mid-April, when the member states submit their National Reform Programmes (NRP, developed in the framework of the EU’s new Europe 2020 strategy) and contemporaneously the Stability and Convergence Programmes (SCP, developed in the framework of the Stability and Growth Pact), taking into account the guidelines dictated by the European Council; b) in the beginning of June when the European Commission, on the basis of the NRP and SCP works out the Recommendations on Economic Policy and budgets addressed to the single member states; c) in the second half of the year when the members states approve their respective budget laws on the basis of the Recommendations issued. In an annual report the Commission will give an account of the progress achieved by member countries in the implementation of the Recommendations.
In 2011 the Italian government complied exactly with the deadlines prescribed by the EU, developing the NRP for the pursuit of the objectives of Europe 2020 and the Stability Programme. The two documents have become integral parts of the Document on the Economy and Finance (DEF), the new instrument of economic-financial programming (Law no. 39/2011), approved by the Camera in Resolution No. 6-00080 on April 28.1Also on the Commission’s part the deadlines have been met with the definition, on June 7, of the Recommendations for each of the 27 member countries, in which the obligations defined by the NRP and SCP were evaluated. These Recommendations were made specifically by the ECOFIN on July 12 and then published July 21 in the Official Journal of the European Union. The “European norms” were applied to Italy. In the Recommendations all the principal requirements are expressed, including, first in Trichet’s and Draghi’s August 5 letter and then in the October 26 letter of the Italian government: from fiscal consolidation to the labour market in order to abolish the protections provided by Article 18 of the Statute against firings with the purpose of introducing massive dosages of flexicurity, to the liberalisation of public services and professions, to the abolition of controls and administrative costs in order to make enterprises freer, finally modifying the Constitution “in such a way as to reinforce budget discipline” (point 16 of the “forasmuch” paragraphs of the Recommendations).
The procedural framework of the European Semester, therefore, has produced operative choices and legislative acts constituting the modus operandi of European economic governance. The latter, together with the European Council of March 24-25, 2011, was reinforced by the Euro Plus Pact,2 which the Italian government itself recognised as being “a factor of constitutional innovation”: “The effects of the Pact are not, and will not be, limited to the economic realm […] but extended to the political realm. They are effects destined to take the form of a systematic and increasingly intense devolution of the power of the nation-states in the direction of a common new and increasingly political European entity”.3
The EU, in order to manage the economic-financial crisis, has begun concentrating powers ever increasingly in the European Council, in the ECB and in the two new institutional instances: that of the Euro Summit and its president, who is currently also president of the European Council, Herman van Rompuy. These are the “judges of last resort” who dictate measures on budget balancing and economic policy, also controlling how they are carried out.
Having outlined the institutional development of European governance, I turn to the Trichet-Draghi letter, which has imposed on Italy’s government the implementation of the obligations assumed toward the EU, the condition that has to be met in order to benefit from the ECB’s interventions on the secondary market of state bonds with the purpose of alleviating the spread of the German bunds and to avoid sanctions defined in the six pack. Approved on October 4, 2011, the six pack provides for a deposit of 0.2% of GDP for the country that violates the rule of a 3% limit for the annual deficit convertible into a fine, and it requires bringing the debt to below 60% of GDP by way of one twentieth every three years.4
Trichet and Draghi, strengthened by the Conclusions of the Council of the European Union of July 21 when the Italian government assumed obligations with its “sovereign signature”, requested prioritising the carrying out of “sustainable conditions for balanced budgets” accompanied by “structural reforms”, all measures that have already been defined in the Recommendations. In fact, there is an obsessive repetition of the need to raise the level of competition in public services, also by means of privatising them, redesigning their regulatory and fiscal systems and further reforming the system of national collective wage bargaining – “allowing agreements at company level in such a way as to tailor salaries and working conditions to the specific requirements of the companies, making these agreements more important in contrast to the other levels of negotiation”.5 Although it moves in this direction, nevertheless the June 28 Accord between Confindustria (the employers’ association) and the unions is considered inadequate because it lacks “a careful revision of the norms that govern the hiring and firing of employees”, which will occur, though in a partial way, with Article 8 of Decree-Law 138, approved in August directly following the letter from the central bankers. The ensemble of the July 2011 measures is considered too unaggressive and there is the requirement that the budget be brought close to balance in 2013 – which will be duly approved by Decree Law 138. Another mandatory requirement is action in the area of pensions, in particular in the case of pensions related to length of work life (in Italy there is another modest pension related solely to age) and pensionable age for women.
Finally, as with other countries, there is insistence on the urgency of constitutional changes to anchor balanced budgets to a norm ranking higher than that of an Act of Parliament (legge ordinaria). Draghi’s and Trichet’s government programme is the one that Italy’s governing classes are called on to implement, whether they are centre right or centre left. Given the scant credibility of the Berlusconi government, Sarkozy, in his October 23 press conference was specific about putting “confidence in the ensemble of Italian institutions”, with clear reference to the Presidency of the Republic and the Banca d’Italia. It is no accident that Giorgio Napolitano’s Presidency has come to be transformed from an organ of guarantee of democracy to that of a guarantor of sovereign debt and is characterised by a political interventionism aimed at securing “inevitable structural reforms” for growth. In his talk at Bruges, as reported by the October 27 Il Sole 24 Ore, President Napolitano expressed satisfaction at the “significant innovations” and at the ECB’s contribution in facing the crisis of state debt; he confirmed the centrality of the Euro in constructing Europe and declared support for the precise carrying out of the requirements the EU asked of Italy. There are two other important passages in the Bruges address, referring not so much to the present crisis as to the future: “No Italian political force can continue to govern or can be a candidate to govern without showing that it is conscious of the decisions that must now be taken, even if unpopular, in the national interest and the European interest”; therefore the EU measures must be accepted and implemented without hesitation. It is necessary to act in this way also – this is the second consideration – because “transfers of sovereignty at the European level” are occurring. President Napolitano very accurately identified in the Euro Plus Pact a supplanting of the “rigid dividing wall which the Treaty in force wanted to ratify in order to protect the jurisdiction of the national states, against a progressive extension of the jurisdiction of the Union”.
The majority and the opposition in Italy, just as in the other member countries, have to move within the rigidly confining paths outlined by the EU, because it is to the EU that the sovereignty of the nation states is being transferred. Therefore we are confronting a government of the EU, most often called governance because it is concentrated in the management of the economy and of finance, functioning according to a network of organs at different levels.
The second letter to consider is of course that of the Italian government on the occasion of the European Council and of the Euro Summit of October 26. The Euro Summit, I must stress, has acquired a specific institutional prominence that I would like to highlight.
The contents of the “Italian” letter – the complete text is available at the website of Il Sole 24 Ore – are simply a more meticulous explication of the points set out by Trichet and Draghi. It is enough to scroll through the agenda proposed to realise this. Italy in particular is obliged to approve by 2012 “a reform of labour legislation for purposes of a greater propensity to hire and attentiveness to the needs of company efficiency also through a new regulation of lay-offs for economic reasons in permanent (i.e. not limited-time) full-time job contracts”. Then there is the reeling off of the by now familiar list of structural reforms regarding supplementary contracts (local contracts which supplement the national labour contract), such as the opening of markets in a competitive way in the public services, particularly in local ones, and the liberalisation of the professions, the support of entrepreneurship and innovation, the modernisation of the public bureaucracy with simplification of procedures, the streamlining of the administration of justice, the reform of the state’s constitutional architecture with the reduction of the number of parliamentarians and the abolition of the provinces, the federal reform of the state, greater efficiency of decision-making mechanisms and the strengthening of the role of the executive and of the majority, the modification of constitutional articles relating to freedom of economic initiative, the protection of competition and the commitment to balanced budgets. The government wants then to reduce pension safeguards, to divest itself of the cultural heritage/infrastructure, rationalise public expenditures and reduce the number of workers in the public sector – all of these measures being similar to those adopted by Spain, Portugal and Greece.
The EU’s economic-financial decisions in the course of the crisis have gone hand in hand with the changes to the institutional arrangements. Among the October 23 decisions of the Council of the European Union, the most relevant for us are points 4 and 7. The first point contains a positive evaluation of the efficiency of instruments of economic governance in tune with the European Semester, whose coordination procedures on the European level have, with the Euro Plus Pact and the six-pack, been made more constrictive. Under Point 7 emphasis is put on the responsibility of the European Commission in assuring respect for the EU’s legislation on the part of all the 27 member states, above all as regards the internal market, which is established as the true North Star of the European structure. Reference is then made to the President of the Euro Summit who “will be designated by the heads of state or of governments of the Eurozone on the same occasion in which the European Council elects its president for the same duration. In anticipation of the next election, the current president of the European Council will preside over the meetings of the Euro Summit”. The new institutional figure is disciplined by the rules established in Annex 1 of the Conclusions of – note well – the Euro Summit to be held right after the European Council.
In the October 26 Euro Summit, beyond praise for the obligations accepted in the letter from the Berlusconi government, in very precise terms it is insisted that Italy is to reduce its public debt by 7 % by 2014, which would mean a figure of about 100 billion Euros, introduce into its Constitution a balanced-budget norm and undertake measures to liberalise firings. The Commission is charged with controlling the exact compliance with the programme which the Italian government, whatever its political colour is, is called on to respect – as President Napolitano once again crisply repeated in an Official Note on November 1, in which he “considers by now unalterable the effective decisions taken in the framework of the letter of obligation directed by the government to the European authorities”.
The other decisions of the October 26 Euro Summit have been the increase of resources of the EFSF (European Financial Stability Facility) to provide insurance against risks to private investors and for the establishment of a subsidiary company to “increase the amount of resources available to provide loans, to recapitalise banks and to purchase obligations in the primary and secondary markets”; interventions for recapitalising banks are laid out in Annex 2. Annex 1 contains two institutional innovations. The first consists of the transformation of the Eurogroup, together with the Commission and the ECB, into a “fulcrum of daily management of the Eurozone”, and in the improvement of its operative structures for the purposes of playing “a central role in the implementation of the European Semester”.
To make the deliberations of the Euro Summit effective – and this is the second innovation, already mentioned – a permanent presidency for it was established. On the same October 26, van Rompuy was appointed to this position so as to make it immediately operative. In Annex 1 ten measures are defined in order to establish, among other things, periodic meetings of the Euro Summit with the participation of the heads of state or of governments of the Eurozone and of the president of the Commission. The Euro Summits “will set the strategic orientations for the carrying out of economic policies, for the improvement of competitiveness and for a greater convergence in the Eurozone”. The Eurogroup, now presided over by Jean-Claude Juncker, has to “assure an ever closer coordination of economic policies and the promotion of financial stability”. Point 6 establishes that the “president of the Euro Summit, the president of the Commission and the president of the Eurogroup will meet periodically, at least once a month. The president of the ECB can be invited to participate. The presidents of the oversight authorities and the Chief Executive Officer of the EFSF and the managing director of the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) can be invited on specific occasions”.6
Without modifying the Treaties, without discussion in the national parliaments, without a public debate, already-existing organs have been transformed and new ones created with jurisdictions not foreseen in the Treaties. Step by step, according to the old functionalist model the powers of European government are rendered increasingly pervasive. This has been done, in an interweaving of entities and jurisdictions, by the European Council, the Commission, the Council in its various formations, the Eurogroup and the president of the Euro Summit in close cooperation with the ECB and EFSF (and from 2013 with the ESM). All this has been decided by governments and by the technocracy in order to respond to the markets whose consensus substitutes for that of the citizens. The confirmation of the political supremacy of the markets occurred with their furious response to the proposal of the Greek government to call a referendum on the most recent bailout plan, the one set out in the October 26 Euro Summit. In the face of the prospect of a citizens’ vote, the financial centres made the European stock exchanges collapse on November 1 and made the interest rate on state bonds shoot still further up. The markets will decide, not the citizens – this is the message of November 1.
In 12 months, hardly two years after the coming into effect of the Treaty of Lisbon, the EU, to respond to the economic-financial crisis, transformed its institutions and decision-making procedures, a method which perhaps will not please those who believe that the institutions have to be thought of and organised more geometrico, whereas they are now evolving in contingent modes reacting to time requirements. These EU events confirm the insight of those who have held that the evolution of institutions is always path dependent, that is, conditioned by the needs which they are historically called on to meet. The ruling elites of the EU are well aware of this and indeed act pragmatically though at the same time they do not lose sight of the goals of European construction. According to an interview given by Wolfgang Schäuble, Germany’s Finance Minister: “We all know that we must continue in constructing Europe. We have to go forward step by step – not only today but tomorrow and the day after tomorrow”.7 Schäuble sums up in a few clear sentences entire libraries of books dedicated to explaining the functionalist method of constructing Europe, theorised by its founding father Jean Monnet and expounded with inspired words in the Schuman Declaration of May 9, 1950: “Europe cannot be built in one blow, nor can it be built in a concerted construction: it will be created by concrete actions that first create a solidarity of facts”.8
The first Community, the ECSC (European Coal and Steel Community), made clear the context in which “concrete facts” were to be created: in the economic context, specifically that of carbon and steel. With the EEC, the common market was placed at the centre; with the Treaty of Maasstricht, the EU defined the goal of the single market, no longer with frontiers, for the free circulation of goods, people capital and services (“the four freedoms”). With the Euro, the single currency of 17 of the 27 states of the EU, we come to the toughest challenge because the Euro is not governed by a sovereign state, or by a confederation or federation of states. In the face of the sovereign of the currency, the BCE – defined by Rainer Weinert as the “guardian of the stability of the value of the currency” (Der Hüter der Geldwertstabilität)9 – there is no “single decision-maker” for European fiscal policies.
To compensate for this lack, which in this historical phase is the problem of the EU, the proposal put forward by George Soros among others has not been followed: that of creating a European Ministry of the Treasury.10 The actual solution adopted is more pragmatic and follows the ideas of the 1970 Werner Plan that prefigured a single communitarian centre for decisions on budget policy, which is today constituted by the Eurogroup, the Commission, ECOFIN and by the European Council. The Werner Plan, as articulated by A. Santagostino, provided in fact for a communitarian oversight before governments definitively establish their budgets, in order to impose the commitments needed for national fiscal policies to contribute to the stability of the currency” – it is what the Euro Plus Pact finally established.11
Many volumes have been written to analyse the salient features of European construction, and many disparate “theories” have been developed. It would have been enough to reflect more carefully on the writings of Jean Monnet, or on the fundamental norms of the Treaties as interpreted by the Court of Justice, or on the old but lucid essays of David Mitrany, to be clear that the European structure through the mediation of successive accumulation of jurisdictions had and has as its priority the construction of a single supranational market in which institutions, social relations, environmental and infrastructural conditions, the “four freedoms”, education and “social” policies are all directed to achieving an economy that is highly competitive within the global market.
This project of economic union, of a single supranational market, requires institutional forms that differ from those proper to representative democracy. Mitrany was the first to theorise the contraposition of a “voting democracy” and a “working democracy”, maintaining that authority in the contemporary epoch is legitimised through the results it achieves, that is, as an output democracy, in that it is dependent on efficiency, in the first place the efficiency of the market where the consumer “votes” everyday with his or her feet, choosing the seller that satisfies his or her demand at the lowest price.12
Moreover, Mitrany theorised the spontaneous evolution of communitarian institutions “branch by branch” in such a way that every function would generate the others gradually. It is the big idea that economic integration would produce political integration – the same idea as Monnet’s when he developed his ECSC plan which was to lead to a European political federation via the successive integration of the various economic areas. The result was not the creation of a European society endowed with a democratic constitution, but of a market society with an economic constitution which overturned the principles of 19th-century constitutional charters.
The construction of the Community and now of the European Union has emphasised the role of the market, of the corporation and of finance, which have become the “commanders” of economic, social and institutional relations. The dominion of economy over society, the economismso characteristic of capitalist culture, finds its specific instruments in Articles 101 – 109 of the TFEU (Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union) – the old Articles 81 – 89 of the TEC (Treaty of Rome) reproduced to the letter, aptly defined as theeconomic due process clause– and in the Treaty of Maastricht, acknowledged in Protocols 12 and 13 of the Treaty of Lisbon, which establish price stability, the containment of public expenditures and convergence policies.
For this reason, Fabio Merusi was able to speak years ago of the European Community, proudly, as the murderer of Article 41 of the Constitution: “the Italian government, in fact, (the principal) promoting – and appending (the executive acts) to – the Treaty of Rome on the establishment of the European Economic Community, had introduced into the ‘system of government’ a time bomb that, once detonated, would radically destroy the system and, consequently force it to be regenerated in a diametrically opposed sense: the common market was founded on market institutions and on competition, and the progressive transformation of the Community into a federation of states was to introduce into the Italian federated state as well the market and competition in place of intervention in the economy”.13 Merusi well understood that the “constitutionalisation” of the competitive market would occur thanks to the EU, and now we are at the threshold of its formalisation if the modification of Articles 41 and 81 of the Italian Constitution are approved according to the government’s draft laws now being discussed in the Camera.14
A number of theories have been formulated, as I have said above, on European integration – from Cassese’s imperium mixtum to Pernice’s multilevel governanceto Majone’sregulatory state, or to the post-national democracy of Scharpf – but it would have sufficed just to look, without ideological blinders, at the “words and things” of European institutions in order to reach two conclusions. The first one, already synthesised with clarity by Walter Hallstein, is that the Community “is the creation of the law, is the source of the law and is the legal order;15 which is what the Court of Justice quickly legitimised, confirming that European institutions are a “community of law”. The second conclusion, also legitimised by Court judgements, is that with the Treaties there is a transference of sovereignty on the part of the member states, jurisdiction by jurisdiction.
There is indeed an original feature of the European construction, and it is that the EU is a juridical order of the marketbeyond the national states.
Up to now the capitalist market and national state have been intertwined organisms, one being born for and through the mediation of the other; in the epoch of the global market – this is the novelty – there is an affirmation of the large economic supranational spaces, managed with legal instruments – soft and hard law – no longer developed and handled by the nation states as in the time of the “liberal” British empire, or of the brutal Nazi Reich with its Großraum, or more recently of the imperial hegemony of the USA. It is supranational organisms that build and manage these spaces. The EU is the most advanced experience in the organisation of a large economic space, and the European countries are acting as a function of this objective of a single continental market.
The state is no longer the necessary condition for the construction, the existence and the development of the capitalist market. Beyond the state the market remains, and once again this is not the spontaneous product of economic forces, but the conscious construction in which the states, the financial and entrepreneurial elites and the technocracy participate. The political management of the big economic spaces is entrusted to supranational decision-making centres which arise without democratic legitimation and live without democratic consensus, not even electoral consensus. Gianni Ferrara is completely right when he spoke, already some years ago, of this process as a “liberation from democracy”. This is why Fausto Bertinotti’s observation is just as pertinent when he speaks of the “impermeability” of EU institutions by democratic instances.16 It is not a matter of a deficit of democracy, which has been discussed for decades. In the EU we are looking at a transfer of sovereignty toward entities – formed by heads of state or of governments, the technocracy, economic-financial centres – guided by operative strategies and lines geared only to the construction and functioning of markets. Brussels and Frankfurt have become the centres of power: a circuit of institutions at the service of markets, from which democracy has been expelled.17
If one wants to identify heuristic models to give an account of the development of the EU, one can turn to the apparatus of categories of theOrdo-liberalismus. It is a mistake to think of the (neo)liberals as supporters of the minimalist state intended simply as a “night-watchman”, only for the maintenance of security and public order, as if market society could live in conditions of anarchy without more comprehensive institutions, articulated legal systems or rules and regulators (now called “independent authorities”). On the contrary, the (neo)liberals – from Eucken to Müller-Armack to Röpke and to Erhard, and I would also include Hayek – have always affirmed the central importance for the market of the legal order, emphasising that the latter could exist and develop even beyond the national state, which is only one of its possible manifestations. Also in the writings of Robbins and Einaudi there are analyses of the nexuses between market and political federalism on the supranational level, as they explain that to function the market does not need to be protected and closed within the borders of the nation state.18 What are needed are institutions capable of making contracts binding and private property secure, in the framework of the guarantee of a comprehensive functioning of market society – from free competition to the reproduction and mobility of the work force.
We are facing the historical experience of an imperium œconomicum. European integration is occurring via a “permanent revolution of the market”, which redefines and dislocates sovereignty itself. To the question of who today is the sovereign in the EU, Sonja Puntscher Riekmann responded ten years ago: the Commission which, with the support of the Court of Justice, has assumed the role of Statthalter, of a Proconsul over the states.19 Today, with more correspondence to reality, one could say that the markets are the sovereigns and that the EU governs in their name.
The expression “embedded liberalism” has been forged to express this interpenetration between institutions and markets; I have used the expressionimperium œconomicumcoined by Puntscher Riekmann. One might find forced the parallelism between today’s European Commission and the commissioners of the ancien régime, sent into the provinces with powers to destroy local privileges and principalities for the purpose of centralising the power of the national monarchist state; certainly, however, one cannot refute her theory that today in the project of the world market, which guides the capitalist forces and its ruling elites, the political supremacy of the capitalist economy is being expressed. For this reason the questions of sovereignty and democracy seem inapt and anachronistic, substituted as they are by those of economic efficiency and the effectiveness of decisions, which characterises output democracy.
Puntscher Riekmann held that the decision-making centres connected to networks of economic interests and the administrative apparatuses “replace the sovereign”: power in actu and not in situ. One wonders, taking up an expression of Foucault’s: is there a power without a centre, which is manifested only in acts? The answer is before our eyes in this empire of wealth where the law is the minimisation of costs and the maximisation of profits, where the social essence of any material or immaterial good is measured by its value in money, where every individual is an agent of the market. The world market has become the res publica.20
The EU is increasingly taking on the connotation of an imperium œconomicum, of a market society without democracy, in which even the census is re-established with the capacity to vote being measured and weighed with money. Who has more counts for more.
1) Camera dei deputati, www.camera.it, Temi under the item governance.
2) Conclusions of the European Council, March 24-25, 2011, Point 11 and Annex 1 “Stronger Economic Policy Coordination for Competitiveness and Convergence”.
3) DEF, Camera dei deputati, doc. LVII, n. 4, p. 5.
4) European Union Council, October 4, 2011, n. 14998/11, www.consilium.europa.eu
5) Corriere della Sera, September 29, 2011, p. 3.
7) Die Zeit, no. 40, 2011, p. 5.
8) In Le plan Schuman dans l’histoire, edited by Andreas Wilkens, Brussels, 2004, pp. 45-47.
9) In Europäisierung nationaler Gesllschaften, edited by Maurizio Bach, Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie, Sonderheft 40/2000, p. 69.
10) Il Sole 24 Ore, September 18, 2011, p. 19.
11) In Culture economiche e scelte politiche nella costruzione europea, edited by Daniela Felisini, Bari 2010, pp. 112-118.
12) David Mitrany, A Working Peace System, London 1943, pp. 6 and 9.
13) Democrazia e autorità indipendenti [Democracy and Independent Authorities], Bologna 2000, pp. 13-14.
14) For the reform of Article 41, see XVI Legislatura, Disegno di legge, Atto Camera n. 4144-A, with the Relazione della 1a Commissione; for Article 81, see XVI Legislatura, Disegno di legge, Atto Camera n. 4620.
15) “Sie ist Schöpfung des Rechts, sie ist Rechtsquelle, und sie ist Rechtsordnung”, Walter Hallestein, Die Europäische Gemeinschaft, Düsseldorf, 1973, p. 33.
16) Gianni Ferrara, in Ripensare lo Stato, Milan, 2003, p. 683; Fausto Bertinotti, in Alternative per il socialismo, no. 18, p. 16.
17) See Paul Craig, The Lisbon Treaty, Oxford 2010, pp. 287-91.
18) Lionel Robbins, Economic Planning and International Order, London 1937; Luigi Einaudi, I problemi economici della federazione europea, Milan 1945, reprinted Milan 2004.
19) In Europäisierung nationaler Gesellschaften, op. cit., p. 147.
20) Sonja Puntscher Riekmann, Die kommissarische Neuordnung Europas, Vienna – New York, 1998, pp. 7-12 and 16.